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Abstract
Our government is confronted with many unintended effects of policy programs. In order to
address these problems, a large number of public sector reforms have been implemented over
the past decades. These reforms formed a reaction to implementation problems rather than to
problems in relation to policy content: more and more, policy makers seem to have
recognised that not so much the provisions that were offered, but the process of policy
implementation generated its own effects and was an important source of problems. At times,
high expectations existed as concerns the effects of policy sector reforms. Time and again,
however, reform outcomes did not live up to expectations. How come?
These reforms were mostly aimed at human service provision: the softer sectors of
the public sphere in which interaction between citizens (in their role as clients) and the state
takes place, as in the field of education, the police, public assistance, health care, etc. Human
service provision is of a fundamentally mixed nature: general regulations are applied to
individual clients. In day-to-day business, implementation problems are the result of inherent
dilemmas in human service provision. We argue that these reforms do not live up to
expectations, because they cannot fully cope with the dilemmas that originate from the
fundamentally mixed nature of human service provision.
In this paper we make a start with combining insights from implementation theory
with research on public sector reform. We argue that this link has been missing so far in
discussions on public management and public sector reform. The inherent ‘mixedness’ in
human service provision needs to be acknowledged in order to better understand the effects of
public sector reform in organisations that provide ‘human services’ .
This paper is structured as follows. First, we build an argument as to why human
service organisations have a inherent ‘mixed’ nature. We discuss three levels on which this
‘mixedness’ is observable: on the level of the organisational environment, the level of the
organisational structure and on the level of individual service provision. Second, we briefly
discuss the rise and characteristics of reform trajectories in the Dutch public sector. We link
the ideas and features of these reform strategies to the unique nature of human service
provision in order to explain why these kinds of reform do not result in their expected
outcomes.
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21 The inherent 'mixedness' of human service provision
Human service provision is at once a 'public' and a 'private' issue. It is the place where the
private – the individual client – meets the public – the law, the official, the organisation. The
process of human service provision is the process where private and public interact and there
the fundamentally mixed nature of human service provision emerges. Human service
provision after all implies the application of public regulations to individual cases. Human
service provision applies the abstract, the general, the collective to the concrete, the specific,
the individual. In this section, we argue that this fundamental 'mixedness' saturates the human
service provision process and organisation.
Human service organizations are defined as the 'set of organizations whose principal
function is to protect, maintain, or enhance the personal well-being of individuals by defining,
shaping, or altering their personal attributes' (Hasenfeld, 1983, 1). Human service
organizations (HSOs) differ from other governmental organizations in that human beings are
their raw material. Human service organisations apply policies to clients. Doing so, human
service organisations distribute collective means over individual citizens or apply the norms
and values of the welfare state upon the individual citizen. This creates specific provision
dynamics in which collective and individual norms, values, interests interact. This occurs at
three levels of organisation, derived from Hasenfeld's (1983) discussion of Human Service
Organisations: 1) the organisation's environment; 2) the organisation's internal structure and
3) the level of actual case administration, where interaction between the individual service
provider (the street-level bureaucrat; Lipsky, 1980) and the individual client takes place.
1.1 The organisation's environment
The environment of human service organisations is characterized by a multitude of actors in
the task environment, each pursuing their own interests concerning the organisation's aims,
procedures and work methods. These actors possess resources relevant to the human service
organisation, such as money, legitimacy, authority, clients, and complementary services
(Hasenfeld, 1983, 61). In interaction, they define the organisation's mandate, goals and
resources and therefore cannot be ignored by the human service organisation.
The mandate and goals of human service organisations often remain ill-defined or
contradictory in character (Hasenfeld, 1983). This can be explained by the fact that the actors
in the task environment do not agree on the tasks and goals of a human service organisation.
Political processes determine the formulation of the organisation's mandate and goals. At
times, disagreement on goals and procedures is translated into compromises or even
                                                                                                                                                       
argument made in the paper.
3contradictory goals in legislation. For example, the law defining the goals and procedures of
public assistance formulates various goals: guaranteeing a minimum level of existence,
providing other types of assistance when necessary (depending on the situation of the
individual) and promoting the reintegration of the applicant on the labour market (Van der
Veen, 1990). The human service provider thus needs to fulfil three contradictory roles: an
administrative role (determining whether someone is eligible for financial assistance), a social
role (providing all kinds of assistance, such as education, counseling, etc.) and a controlling
role (checking whether the applicant has made or is making an effort to find a job). It is then
up to the human service organisation to prioritize the various roles. Human service
organisations may try to meet the requirements set by the most powerful actors, in order to
secure the organisation’s survival. In sum, due to conflicting interests in the task environment
of human service organisations, these organisations are left with ill-defined and possibly
contradictory goals.
1.2 The organisation's internal structure
The above mentioned ambiguity of the organisational goals has an impact on the
organisation's internal structure. The human service organisation needs to translate
contradictory goals into a service technology. A service technology can be defined as a 'set of
institutionalized procedures aimed at changing the physical, psychological, or cultural
attributes of people in order to transform them from a given status to a prescribed status'
(Hasenfeld, 1983, 111).
Determining a human service technology is in itself a very complicated process. How
to 'heal' a psychiatric patient? How to treat a sexual abuser? How to educate an academic?
There is a general lack of knowledge about human behaviour which prevents the organisation
to formulate a clear set of activities which will lead to goal attainment. Often, only the
individual professional in an HSO commands this knowledge. As a result, he has the ultimate
decision-making authority in the service provision process. Above that, the task environment
often produces ill-defined and possibly contradictory goals. This contributes even more to the
complications of defining a human service technology. What is more important, however, is
that it limits the capacity of human service organisations to structure the action of individual
human service providers. The latter have some freedom to choose from among the set of
conflicting goals the environment sets.
The consequence of a lack of a set of well-defined, coherent organisational goals
together with the problems attached to establishing a service technology is that most human
service organisations cannot be orderly structured by means of standard operating procedures
and a hierarchical system of authority. Instead, human service organisations have loosely
coupled structures, characterised by little coordination and connection between the various
4organisational activities; a weak system of control; and a weak, or multiple system of
authority. Various parts of the organisation will focus on different actors or coalitions in the
task environment, with the aim to keep those actors happy that are important to the
organisation’s survival. Rules or other coordinating mechanisms are of no help, since
agreement on the precise elaboration of the human service technology or the exact set of goals
to be attained is lacking. This has consequences for the degree of autonomy the individual
service provider enjoys.
1.3 The level of case administration
At the level of case administration, the human service provider and the client interact. There
is interdependence between the human service provider and the applicant. Both have different
sources of power and different aims when using that power: the human service provider is the
gateway to (free) services (i.e. benefits, pensions, counseling, etc), while the citizen has the
information required to determine eligibility. Once decided to be eligible, the status and social
position of the individual changes, giving him rights and access to public services (Hasenfeld
1983).
The individual service provider finds himself in a position between client and
organisation. This position is a source of stress. The applicant for a service has an information
advantage over the public service provider, while the service provider can give access to a
much-wanted service. Hence, the public service is a result of an exchange process, in which
the applicant gives information in exchange for a service. At the same time, the service
provider is expected to engage in an exchange with his organisation. He needs to supply the
information the organisation needs to justify that the service or benefit is indeed disbursed. As
a result, the service provider is caught between possibly conflicting demands.
This stressful position, however, also adds to the individual providers' power and
autonomy. On the level of case administration we find a fairly independent, autonomous
service provider. He works in an organisational structure that cannot provide clearly defined
standard operating procedures. As a result, therefore, a strong hierarchical system of authority
does not exist in practice. The degree of autonomy of the service provider also stems from the
fact that provider-applicant interaction is required for the service (Lipsky, 1983; Prottas,
1979). The service provider is in a strong position vis-à-vis  the applicant and the human
service organisation. Vis-à-vis the organisation, the service provider has a monopoly over
information on the applicant; vis-à-vis the client, the service provider has a monopoly over
information on rules, regulations and organisational demands. His position between client and
human service organisation contributes to the service provider's independent position in the
human service process.
As we see, the ambiguities that exist at higher levels of organisation (in the
5organisation itself and in the political environment of the organisation) are transferred to the
level of the individual service provider. In the end, he is forced to weigh these demands in
order to devise a decision in the case of the individual client. Human service organisations
mostly exist in an environment that imposes ambiguous goals upon them; goal ambiguity
entails that human service technologies are often ill defined; as a result of that, human service
organisations often function as loosely coupled systems and street-level bureaucrats enjoy a
high level of autonomy. This implies that indeterminate deliberations are made at any
organisational level of human service provision. As a result, the performance of a human
service organisation can be satisfactory on one dimension and very disappointing on another,
depending on the dynamics of human service provision.
1.4 The inherent 'mixedness' of human service provision
Implementing a human service policy implies that the concrete, specific, individual is aligned
with the abstract, general, collective, on all levels of organisation. To give an example: the
administration of public assistance implies that the individual interest of the client (e.g.
financial support) is aligned with a collective interest that is also related to the client's position
(activation, social integration, equality, fairness, or other). The individual interests of the
street-level bureaucrat (work conditions, income, self-esteem) are combined with collective
interests related to the way the street-level bureaucrat fulfils his tasks (cost containment,
equality, fairness, reciprocity). The individual interest of the organisation (budget
maximisation à la Niskanen, for instance) is aligned with collective interests related to the
organisation of the field (the containment of administrative costs). The individual interests of
actors in the environment of a human service provision organisation (political parties, e.g.:
maximisation of votes and various ideologically inspired views on the function and
functioning of public services) are aligned with the collective interests of the welfare state at
large (the 'optimisation', whatever that is, of the actual functioning of human service
provision).
Therefore, fundamentally, human service provision suffers from complexities. The
complexity of combining public, collective and private, individual requirements prevails at all
three levels of organisation. In the environment, but in any case at the level of individual case
administration a deliberation of collective and individual requirements is expressed. In the
end, and necessarily so, public service organisations are to weigh and combine individual and
collective interests. This fundamental complexity is exactly what causes the unintended
consequences of human service implementation. If an autonomous service provider allows his
own professional norms to prevail, he might not be interested in the organisation's interest in
cost containment, and thus the problem of inefficiency or inequality emerges. The self-
interested applicant of a service might hide relevant information, which makes him eligible
6for a service, and hence the problem of legality (and control) emerges.
To summarise, the fundamental complexity that the alignment of individual and collective
interests entails stands in the way of the maximisation of an organisation's performance.
Performance maximisation is impossible to a considerable extent, because the improvement
of performance necessarily entails that conflicting interests are weighed against each other.
Maximising performance in relation to a single policy goal, comes down to only a partial
improvement of performance. And even if some policy-making actors do put forward a clear
maximisation goal, there is room to manoeuvre in actual policy implementation because
conflicts abide in the task environment. As a result, a clearly defined set of goals is not
produced, which leaves the prioritisation of goals to the organisation. The organisation in
itself is incapable of providing structured work processes and focused goals, leaving the
decision-making authority in the service provision process to the individual service provider.
And even if clear-cut goals are set in the upper organisational layers of human service
provision, the individual service provider on his turn still needs to apply the general to the
concrete, to weigh collective and individual interests, when making decisions in the
individual case.
2 Modes of public sector reform and their effects in HSOs
What does it mean if human service organisations are confronted with reform trajectories that
aim at improving the performance of these organisations? Let us first briefly discuss the rise
and character of public sector reforms in the Netherlands as well as the question how to
analyse the effects of these reform efforts.
2.1 Public sector reform in the Netherlands
In the 1908s and 1990s, policy makers were confronted with widespread implementation
problems in human service provision and proposed reforms to battle these problems.
Efficiency problems (resulting from organisations' lack of capacity or willingness to contain
costs), problems of responsiveness (organisations' failure to address individuals' legitimate
needs) and legality problems (failure to follow legally defined rules and procedures) were
observed virtually everywhere.
Just to name a few: public employment agencies (RBA's) suffered problems of
efficiency and responsiveness. These agencies were seen as cumbrous organs where the
unemployed were obliged to register as job seekers and employers were obliged to announce
their vacancies, but where nothing happened afterwards. In another field, the police suffered
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was not able to increase the number of policemen performing active work on the streets. The
police had turned into an organisation producing dossiers instead of maintaining order. The
Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) suffered legality problems and efficiency
problems. When in doubt, IND-workers were inclined to decide to the advantage of the
applicant, because the refusal of applicants' requests would have serious consequences.
Medical examiners for the Disability Insurance Act (WAO) showed a comparable pattern of
action. This conflicted with legality. If IND-applicants' requests were indeed refused, a
virtually endless trajectory of court appeals was possible that went against efficiency.
Hypothetically, policy makers could take three main routes to tackle these problems
of human service provision: the reinforcement of bureaucratic, professional or market
provision (Hill and Hupe, 2002; Terpstra and Havinga, 1999). Bureaucratic provision is
characterised by an emphasis upon formal rules and regulations; the administration is directed
towards rule conformity (of administrators and clients); and the control regime is of a
hierarchical nature (Terpstra and Havinga, 1999). Professional provision is characterised by
an emphasis upon substantial quality considerations in relation to the service offered;
administration is directed towards differentiated action, designed to fit individual clients'
needs and requirements; the control regime is based upon collegial review and feedback
(ibid.). Market provision emphasises productivity and cost containment; administration is
directed towards efficiency (normally understood and measured in quantitative terms) and the
smooth functioning of the administrative process; a less pure form of market provision is
based upon control targets, performance indicators and quality management (ibid.).
These modes of organisation aim at the improvement of specific aspects of the
organisation's performance. Market provision aims at improving efficiency, bureaucratic
provision aims at improving legality and professional provision aims at improving
responsiveness. Indeed, such reforms of the organisational logics of human service provision
were implemented recently. In Holland, all three reform modes can be identified.  We saw a
strong shift towards marketisation in the field of employment services: the privatisation of
reintegration services by force of the Work and Income (Implementation Structure) Act (Wet
Suwi). A shift towards market provision was also visible in the police organisation. In 2002,
the Home Secretary and the Attorney General and the regional police force managers signed
the National Framework Dutch Police Services 2003-2006 (TK 28.824, no. 1, appendix). The
framework was to function as the base-line for regional voluntary agreements in which
performance requirements and the financial remuneration were to be established. With respect
to IND- and WAO-administration, reforms resulted in the limitation of professional autonomy
and the reinforcement of bureaucratic control: a shift towards the bureaucratic mode of
organisation. Rules and regulations were specified to such extent that the administrator's
8discretion was contained. The 2000 Aliens Act was aimed at clarifying and specifying the
intent of various regulations on the one hand and at limiting the appeal options on the other
(TK 26.732, no. 3, p. 1-10). Various reforms of the Disability Insurance Act and disability
insurance administration have also led to a specification of the disability concept (the
Disability Benefit Schemes (entitlement) Act, Wet TBA; Eligibility for Permanent Disability
Benefit (Restrictions) Act, Wet verbetering poortwachter) and to a nationalised, purely public
administration of disability insurance under reinforced supervision (the Work and Income
(Implementation Structure) Act, Wet SUWI).
In short, we think that a shift occured away from professionalism, in the direction of
reinforced market or bureaucratic provision of human services, with an emphasis on market
and performance measurement. It was these kinds of reforms that were proposed to change
the work processes of human service organisationes to such an extent that more legality or
efficiency in services would be achieved.
2.2 The expected effects of public sector reforms in HSOs
In order to analyse the expected effects of reform trajectories on human service organisations,
three factors have to studied closely: 1 the accuracy and feasibility of the policy problem
diagnosis, 2 the extent that environmental conditions for reform success are met and 3 the
specific dynamics of the human service organisation the reform is aimed at. In the following,
we describe three situations in which these components have a different character.
2.2.1 The problem diagnosis and the reform trajectory
The accuracy and feasibility of the problems diagnosis determine reform success. Basically,
three kinds of problems are being signalled in the public sector: these are the problem of
inefficiency, the problem of the span of control and the problem of immunity to the
environment, leading to all kinds of implementation problems.  A solution to increasing
inefficiency is the introduction e of the market mechanism. With help of financial incentives
it is believed that the efficiency will increase. A response to the span of control problem is
decentralization and deregulation in combination with a clear formulation of output
indicators. Instead of rules determining the organisation’s work process, political actors
formulate output indicators  to control policy implementation. It is up to the organisation to
determine how the performance is organised and achieved. A response to increasing
immunity to the environment is solved by introducing a participatory model.
Given the fundamentally mixed nature of human service provision, the relation
between problem diagnosis and reform trajectory can be  problematic in two ways. In the first
place, a clear and unambiguous problem diagnosis may indeed suit a reform trajectory that is
quite one-dimensional, since each of the three trajectories of reform addresses a single
9specific problem. However, these modes of organisation also have a downside (see figure 1).
Performance aspect ◊
Organisational logic ↓
Efficiency Responsiveness Legality
Professionalism Low High Low
Bureaucracy Low Low High
Market High Low Low
Figure 1. Modes of service provision and their intended and unintended
effects.
While market provision may be strong in efficiency, its outcomes in relation to
responsiveness and legality are weaker. Comparably, bureaucracy scores high on legality and
lower on efficiency and responsiveness, while professional provision scores high on
responsiveness, but lower on efficiency and legality. Therefore, we argue, a clear and
unambiguous policy diagnosis and a reform trajectory that indeed suits the diagnosis, may
indeed solve the diagnosed problem, but it fails to appreciate that human service provision is
aimed at a multiplicity of goals and that maximisation of performance in relation to a single
goal engenders performance problems in relation to other goals.
As it appears, policy makers try to address performance problems (understood as
problems of efficiency, responsiveness or legality) either by shifting from one mode of
organisation to another, or by introducing elements of other modes of organisation into the
existing structure. Apparently, the assumption is held that the maximisation of a single
specific performance aspect (e.g. efficiency) does not affect other aspects of organisational
performance (responsiveness or legality). This assumption is incorrect, however. The
improvement of performance is a trade-off, and necessarily so: gains in terms of efficiency
imply losses in terms of responsiveness and/or legality; gains of responsiveness engender
losses of efficiency and/or legality; legality gains bring costs in terms of responsiveness or
efficiency.
In the bureaucratic mode of organisation, for example, rules are imposed upon the
individual worker, who is expected to apply these to clients in a neutral manner, disregarding
client characteristics that are deemed irrelevant in the formal sense of the word: not
recognised in the regulations. It is then to be expected that the legality of human service
provision improve. However, such rule-based implementation of human services necessarily
disregards conditions that may – in the material sense of the word – be relevant for service
provision, while not being adequately phrased in the regulations. Hence, the responsiveness of
service provision is at stake. Furthermore, the bureaucratic organisational mode does not
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include an inherent emphasis upon efficiency: regulations normally grant some benefit or
service to a client if the client shows some pre-defined characteristic. Also the procedure that
is followed is pre-defined. As a result, there is no means and no incentive to contain
administrative costs (the costs of the administrative process) or service costs (the costs of the
service that is provided). Market based service provision may result in a focus on cost
containment or the achievement of performance indicators. This may induce goal
displacement in terms of the denial of service to deserving beneficiaries or the inadequate
accommodation of service provision to client characteristics or requirements of service
provision. Hence, the legality and responsiveness of service provision decreases. Professional
service provision may promote responsiveness because of the high quality considerations the
professional makes, but is also expensive and may conflict with the norm of legality.
The second problematic aspect of the relation between problem diagnosis and reform
trajectory concerns the fact that most reform plans lack clearly and unambiguously
formulated goals. As mentioned, human service organisations often exist in an environment
that imposes ambiguous goals upon them. This translates into the problem diagnosis that
political actors may make and the reform trajectories they propose. Hence, we often do not
find a clear and unambiguous problem diagnosis to begin with. This is apparently visible, we
think, in the political debate on the Social Development Act (Wet Maatschappelijke
Ontwikkeling, WMO) that is to replace elements of other legislation regulating the extra-
mural care for various categories of less well-off citizens. As concerns the organisation of
WMO-implementation and the provisions that are to be disbursed, policy-making actors have
not put forward clear and unambiguous goals upon the actors that are to implement the new
policy. Human service mixedness, so to speak, is integrated in the reform proposals as they
are currently put forward. The new Act is a hybrid act and this results in a replacement of
human service dilemmas in a downward direction: from policy-makers to service providers.
In general, we argue, a trade-off is visible between two aspects of the process of goal
formulation in human service organisations. On the one hand, there might be clear and
unambiguous goals but these nevertheless result in an inadequate response to the multiplicity
of goals as a result ofhuman services' inherent'mixedness'. On the other hand, most of the
times unclear and ambiguous goals are set by the organisation’s environment that do not
really solve implementation problems, but merely replace the dilemmas inherent in human
service provision downwardly. This trade-off between aspects of organisational performance
is caused by the fundamentally mixed nature of human service provision.
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2.2.2 The relation between environmental conditions and a reform trajectory
If a proposed reform would relate to the problem diagnosis, we need to consider to what
extent environmental conditions for successful reform are met. For example, creating a
market to tackle problems of inefficiency can only be achieved if certain conditions are met.
One can think of the condition of the presence of a market structure; the presence of cheap
and accurate information; the fact that the transaction costs are not higher than in a
bureaucracy or other organisation structure; and the fact that clients ('purchasers') are
motivated by financial incentives (Bartlett & LeGrand, 1993). If any of these conditions are
not met, one might wonder whether the reform will lead to the expected result of increasing
efficiency. The same goes for introducing performance measurement as a new coordination
mode. Conditions for success are, among others, that the policy goals should be unequivocal
and measurable; that the performance can be measured in quantitative entities; that the
collection of information on these indicators is possible and not open to manipulation, etc
(Van Sluis & Van Thiel, 2003).
If one only briefly glimpse at these conditions of success, we can see that many of
these conditions are hard to meet in a human service organisation. For example, there is a lack
of unequivocal goals and measurable indicators, because many human service organisations
work with a so-called 'soft human service technology' in which a clear causal chain is absent.
Hence, how to attribute organisational performance to specific interventions? How to quantify
vague and broad terms of success? How to take into account those factors that influence
performance but are not manageable by the organisation? Think for example about a
deteriorating economy, which leads to an increase of recipients of welfare benefits. If the
proposed trajectory cannot meet these conditions for success, we can expect specific
unintended consequences to arise.
An example of this is the reform of the implementation structure of labour
reintegration policy in East Town, a city somewhere in Holland.2 Labour reintegration policy
used to be coordinated and implemented by a mix of a bureaucratic and professional
structures within the own municipal organisation. Municipal social service organisations and
regional labour exchange agencies were the main actors in this field. On the national level it
had been decided years ago to privatise the implementation of this policy with the aim to
improve efficiency. The  way the city of East Town organised and structured this reform was
half-heartedly however. The conditions for (quasi) marketisation to be effective were not met,
partially because the municipal authorities feared a loss of control. The authorities kept in
control by only allowing block contracts with the private reintegration agencies with concern
to yearly volumes of clients. The municipality itself remained responsible for assigning the
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clients and wanted the private agences to report regularly on their performance. This mix of
various coordination modes together with an absence of some of the pre-conditions of
succesfull market reform created an interesting, but unintended dynamic. No real supplier
structure was created and clients did not have the freedom to purchase their services on an
individual basis. Another important aspect was the lack of transparent and unambiguous
information about the costs of the tasks to be performed. This made it impossible for the
municipality to compare the performance and cost-price-indicators of the various private
agencies contracted to take care of labour reintegration. This gave the private agencies quite
some leeway in their operations. This example shows a lack of conditions of success in order
for the market mechanism to work. This is no coincidence, since the task of these kinds of
organisations is very hard to quantify or clarify. This is essential to human service
organisations: the presence of a ‘soft technology’ is one of the most important factors that
obstructs successful marketisation, since it contradicts many of the preconditions of
successful marketisation.
2.2.3 The specific dynamics of the human service organisation under reform
Even if the proposed reform is related to the problem diagnosis and the conditions for success
are met, one might still wonder to what extent the reform will actually trickle down into the
organisation and the daily work processes. It is here where the fundamentally mixed nature of
human service organisations once again comes into play. Even though public sector reform
aims at moving the orientation of individual service providers into a specific  mode of service
provision, the individual provider  has a variety of means to cope with this pressure and the
organisational reform does not in the end solve the dilemmas the service providers faces.
Because the individual service provider has an information advantage over both the
'regulator' (public regulations, represented the organisation the service provider works in and
the regulatory action the organisation takes towards the provider) and the client, he is able to
evade pressure from both directions. But the other way around, the second issue, pressures
from both sides do exist and these pressures do not disappear by shifting the mode of
organisation. In the end, no matter how the organisation he works in is controlled, the
individual service provider still needs to apply abstract, public, general rules and regulations
to the concrete, private, individual client.
Above, we argued that reform success depends upon three issues: the adequacy of reform
proposals in relation to problems diagnosis, environmental conditions for success, and the
extent to which public sector reforms address the specific dynamics of human service
provision. The image of the layers of onion skin seems to apply: when the 'adequacy of
problem diagnosis'-issue is peeled off, environmental conditions for success become relevant.
When the 'environmental conditions'-issue is peeled off, the attention needs to shift to actual
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service provision. We argue that the core of the onion – the core of the problem of human
service provision – is indeed the actual service provision process. Since human service
dilemmas cannot be fully solved in the outside skin of the onion, the individual service
provider needs to weigh the public against the private in the individual case. Because it is
virtually impossible to fully structure the actions of the individual service provider, time and
again implementation problems return in the outer skin of the onion of human service
provision. The fundamentally mixed nature of human service provision, at first primarily
present at the individual level, time and again affects conditions in the outside skin.
3 From maximisation to optimisation: coherence as a partial solution
Based on the above, we conclude that maximisation of one specific aspect of performance
negatively affects the achievement of other performance aspects. A potential solution to this
lies in a change from a 'maximisation strategy' to an 'optimisation strategy'. In order to
optimise the functioning of public service organisations, Hill and Hupe (2002) argue for
coherence: a coherent organisation of service provision in the three levels (environment,
organisation and individual service provision) leads to the optimisation of service provision. 
Hill and Hupe observe three possible logics of organisation: persuasion (professionalism);
market-based organisation (transaction) and bureaucracy (authority). Highly complex
individual case administration requires that this level functions according to a logic of
persuasion; that the organisation functions as a loosely coupled system; and that the
environment allows that various views and opinions on the meaning and aims of the service
come to the fore. The argument may also be made the other way around in the way that
Hasenfeld (1983) did as well: a complex environment requires loosely coupled organisations
and professionalism in individual case administration.
Gastelaars (2000) also makes a ‘coherence argument’ in her distinction between six
types of human service organisations. The added value of Gastelaars' distinction is that she
argues that the set of human service organisations is differentiated: there is not just one type
of human service organisations. The different types are defined by the characteristics of the
organisation's environment, organisational structure and the characteristics of the level of
individual provision. The environmental differences are determined by the dominant frame of
reference in the organisation's environment and the core values dominating the political and
public debate. The organisational differences can be described in differences in management,
organisation and coordination structures as well as in differences in technology. The provider
level can be described in terms of the role of the provider and the characteristics of the client.
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Gastelaars implicitly argues that coherence in these dimensions is important for human
service provision to work. This makes this distinction of interest in the discussion about the
effects of public sector reform in human service organisations. Gastelaars’ distinction seems
to suggest that a shift in the frame of reference and core values of the environment of the
organisation could require a different organisational form for the service provision to work.
With respect to public sector reform, we see a shift towards rationalisation and
commercialisation and core values such as goal effectiveness and efficiency. Hence,
Gastelaars seems to suggest that if these frames and values change to this direction, human
service organisations should be designed more as a mass-service delivery system than as a
selection bureaucracy or a professional organization.
For some types of service organisations, we argue, such a reform mode may be
feasible. Such internal coherence is only attainable in relation to specific types of human
service provision, i.e. the more simple ones. Market-oriented reform may indeed be
introduced in human service organisations that are primarily characterised by 'mass servicing'
or that fulfill tasks that can be easily transformed into mass delivery products. However, this
can only be done if the organisation’s  technology is characterised by clear causal chains. The
distribution of passports may be an example. For example, marketisation is less feasible if the
human service organisation technology is less ‘hard’, for example if the organisation is a care
provider or is assigned to change people.
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Selection bureaucracy Mass-service delivery Professional
service provision
Voluntary
association
Care providers Individual service
provision
Frame of
reference
Legalisation /regulation
and increased state
intervention
Rationalisation and
commercialisation
Professionalisation The separation of
work and spare time
The separation of
work and care
Individualisation
Core values Legal security and
equality before the law
Goal effectiveness and
efficiency
Professional quality Voluntary
involvement
Conituity of care Right of self-
determination
Technology To select To deliver To change To mobilise To take care To negotiate
The service
provider
Street level bureaucrat A cog in the machine Professional Amateur or honorary
professional
Caretaker Negotiator/
mediator
The clients Stake holder Anonymous customer A case Member or volunteer Dependent client Partner
Coordination Procedures Protocols/sales Standard skills and
peer discussion
Rules of the game and
social control
Direct authority Sales and client
satisfaction
Structure Hierarchy Machine ‘Islands’ Egalitarian community Patriarchial
relations
Relation-network
Management Liaison
First responsible
Resource allocator
Entrepreneur
Protector
Negotiator
Figurehead
Charismatic leader
Disturbance
handler +
‘gezaghebbende’
Primus inter pares
Spokes person
M. Gastelaars, 1997
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4 Complex modes of human service provision: ‘managing mixedness'
As concerns the more complex types of human service provision, the coherence argument
underestimates the importance of the fundamentally mixed nature of human service provision.
A coherent organisation of public services is not sufficient to overcome problems of
performance when these more complex types of human service provision are concerned. In
such human service organisations, parts of the work process may be standardized, but in the
end, there will always remain a category of work activities that is characterised by
‘mixedness’.
Together with Terpstra and Havinga (1999) we argue that even if service provision is
internally coherent (same logic at all three levels) organisations will face strain. All three
types of organisational logic (persuasion/professionalism; bureaucracy/authority;
market/transaction) face their own problems when applied in a human service organisation.
As Terpstra and Havinga argue, professionalism may engender problematic control of
administrative costs; bureaucracy may entail a problematic fit between the provided service
and the need that is addressed, while market may engender problems like creaming and
declining fairness of the service. The logic of human service provision, as described earlier,
prevents an optimal functioning of any organisation mode. For example, rule specification in
the bureaucratic mode is not always possible in a human service organisation, due to
‘boundary problems’ (Van der Veen, 1995). Not all rules can be made ‘fit’ to a client’s
individual situation, which creates discretion to the service provider to decide for cases not
specified by law. Hence, even the goal of legality is difficult to achieve. In the market mode,
the achievement of efficiency can be problematic because of problems inherent to the market
mode: due to information problems and information asymmetry in human service
organisations the advantages of the market mode are downplayed. In the professional mode,
the responsiveness of service provision can be endangered due to attempts of the professional
to protect or even expand his power and autonomy (Tonkens, 2003).
All of these three organisational logics entail problems when applied to human
service organisations implementing relatively complex tasks. Market, professionalism and
bureaucracy all to some extent fit private and public requirements, but none of these is
capable of fully aligning these pressures. Human service provision is the co-alignment of
conflicting pressures, eventually at the level of the individual case. The logic of human
service provision causes that the emphases upon cost, upon the client or upon the legal rules
do not go along easily. Because of this reason, implementation problems and unintended
consequences occur, whatever the mode of organisation is.
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The various modes of organisation do not address the logic of human service
provision: they do not solve the condition that human service provision is the co-alignment of
'private', individual interests and 'public', collective ones. Instead, each organisational logic
merely brings forward a single specific constellation of individual and collective interests. A
shift towards one of these modes is a shift away from another. To solve a partial problem
implies creating another problem. The mode of organisation determines which of these
interests are privileged and which are not, but does not solve the problem that not all interests
can be privileged at once. Because of this reason the emphasis upon any organisational logic
cannot fully address performance problems. Each of the three organisational logics creates its
own performance problems, because the combined public-private requirements made upon
the task (at the level of individual case administration, but possibly also at the level of the
organisation or the environment) cannot be fully addressed in each of these logics. Not in any
mode of organisation, for that matter. In other words, the problem of human service provision
optimisation is not a problem of effective organisation. Performance problems are inherent to
human service provision and they occur in any mode of organisation, because of its
fundamentally mixed nature. The three modes of reform all imply a particular balance of
public and private, general and individual, abstract and concrete. One may shift towards each
of these poles, but one cannot fully co-align them.
This conclusion asks for a discussion of the pros as well as the cons of a specific
reform plan proposed as well as attention to the 'winners' and the 'losers'. Attempts to
minimise the costs of the losers might be one way to deal with problems in human service
provision. Another way is to consciously make a political choice, which is explicitly defended
in terms of benefits and costs. In addition, it might be worthwhile to explore whether
improvements within a specific organisation mode according to its own specific logic are
politically more desirable than a change between organisation modes. To what extent this is
feasible is not completely clear at the moment, though. It may be, as the onion metaphor
suggests, that mixing modes of organisation may not fully address the dilemmas that abide in
the core of the onion: individual provision. All in all, we argue, ideas about ways to cope with
the fundamentally mixed nature of human service provision cannot make this nature
disappear. On the contrary, we argue for the explicit acknowledgement of the mixedness of
human service provision
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